Sunday, June 24, 2007

republic of texas: According to the Sentence Ramsey is to be Confined in Texas

republic of texas: According to the Sentence Ramsey is to be Confined in Texas

Former Raza Unida gubernatorial candidate Ramsey Muñiz has been transferred from a federal corrections institute in Three Rivers six months after arriving at the facility.

Muñiz, who ran for governor of Texas in 1974 and 1975 under the Raza Unida Party, was transferred from Three Rivers on Tuesday.

Mike Truman, spokesman for the Federal Bureau of Prisons, said Muñiz is being housed in the Federal Transfer Facility in Oklahoma City until he can be transferred to another facility.

Truman said he could not release where Muñiz would be transferred or when, citing security concerns. He also said he did not know why Muñiz was transferred.

Muñiz, 64, is serving a life sentence for three felony drug convictions.

The Three Rivers Federal Correctional Institute, 77 miles northwest of Corpus Christi, has been the closest the former Miller High School football star and local defense attorney has been to home since his 1994 conviction.

Under the banner of Raza Unida, a political party shaped and led by Hispanic activists seeking a political voice, Muñiz earned support from 6 percent the state's registered voters.

Muñiz's wife, Irma Muñiz, said she was surprised to learn of the transfer especially because senators, congressmen and civic groups have written letters to the Federal Bureau of Prisons on her husband's behalf.

Irma Muñiz said her husband had hoped to be housed at the Three Rivers facility because of its proximity to his family in South Texas.

Since he was transferred there in December from an institute in Colorado, Irma Muñiz has made frequent trips to visit her husband.

She likened Muñiz's transfer out of Three Rivers to the treatment of Hispanic Civil Rights figure Felix Longoria.

Longoria, a U.S. Army private killed on-duty in the Philippines in 1945, was refused a proper funeral in his hometown of Three Rivers because the only funeral home in town didn't allow Hispanics to use its funeral chapel.

Civil Rights hero Dr. Hector P. Garcia interceded and U.S. Sen. Lyndon Johnson arranged for Longoria to be buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Joe Ortiz, League of United Latin American Citizens district director and national and state civil rights director of the American GI Forum, helped organize letter-writing campaigns when Muñiz was in Colorado asking for his transfer to Texas.

Ortiz didn't know about the transfer out of Three Rivers but said both LULAC and the American GI Forum will work toward getting Muñiz returned to Texas.

"We are going to petition our legislators to see if they can do anything to bring him back," Ortiz said.

Contact Adriana Garza at 886-3618 or garzaa@caller.com



Posted by geomatica on June 21, 2007 at 9:47 p.m. (Suggest removal)

I am certain that Ramsey Muniz was falsely imprisoned, but no matter what you believe, he was and is a model prisoner, and it is a complete waste of taxpayer money to be moving him all over, when it makes the most sense for him to be here near his family. He didn't kill anybody, and his treatment has been nothing but inhumane. Something has to be done about the inequities in our prison system. His punishment certainly does not fit his supposed crime. When is his mistreatment and that of his family going to end?

Posted by colorderosa on June 22, 2007 at 9:13 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Only in America does a convicted murderer, chlld rapist, or other harden criminal walk free, while a supposed drug dealer gets life in prison.
colorderosa

Posted by sosiouxme13 on June 22, 2007 at 8:47 p.m. (Suggest removal)

In my opinion, someone convicted of dealing drugs, can be likened to a murderer...

Posted by dannoynted1 on June 23, 2007 at 5:25 a.m. (Suggest removal)

This is retaliation for the "scared status quo". They are afraid if he is in Texas he just might get out.

Only in Texas can this happen.

Eureka~ perhaps Jurisdiction resides in Oklahoma?

or is it Louisiana, where i hear Hayden Head is sending our Federally convicted non white americans as of late?.

Is that legal?
Why would you send a texan to another state unless you want to keep them from their family.

Posted by gmikedear1954 on June 23, 2007 at 3:44 p.m. (Suggest removal)

As a career Federal Agent living in Detroit, Michigan, I find it silly to deny this man the opportunity of being close to his family. As one person stated earlier that far worse criminals are given the option to be close to their family. Also, The whole war on drugs is nothing more than a farce to make contractors rich.

Posted by chuco11 on June 23, 2007 at 8:54 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Ram, you were the impetus for the movement that slowly is gaining speed. Maybe not in our lifetimes but down the road there will be Spanish spoken along with English in the schools, businesses and professional sports, to name a few, all across America not just Texas. "The Man" sees this and doesn't like it! But he can't stop the ineviteable. What was that old adage...."GOD grant me the serenity....... Irma, you are a model of a loving wife. All men should be this fortunate!

Monday, June 18, 2007

Marilyn Lewis Ruff & Chandra Clack Lewis Carrington

Actuary "Ezekial 25:17 - The path of the righteous man is beset on all sides by the inequites of the selfish and the tyranny of evil men. Blessed is he that shepherds the weak from the valley of darkness for he is truly his brother's keeper, and the finder of lost children. And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger those who attempt to poison and destroy my brothers, and you will know my name is the Lord when I lay my vengeance upon thee."


Nemo judex in sua causa
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Nemo iudex in sua causa is a Latin term which describes the principle of natural justice that no person can judge a case in which he or she is a party. Or, no one is fit to be the judge in his own cause.

May also be called:

* nemo iudex idoneus in propria causa est
* nemo iudex in parte sua
* nemo debet esse iudex in propria causa
* in propria causa nemo iudex

This along with the other principle "No man shall be judged unheard" otherwise put "Reasonable opportunity must be given to an accused, in defending his side of the case" forms the twin rules of natural justice.

Friday, June 08, 2007

“the State’s confession of error in the Supreme Court of the United States is contrary to our state’s procedural law for presenting a claim on appeal

Nowhere Else But Texas

Actuary "Ezekial 25:17 - The path of the righteous man is beset on all sides by the inequites of the selfish and the tyranny of evil men. Blessed is he that shepherds the weak from the valley of darkness for he is truly his brother's keeper, and the finder of lost children. And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger those who attempt to poison and destroy my brothers, and you will know my name is the Lord when I lay my vengeance upon thee."





Page 1
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 02-41208
_____________________
VICTOR HUGO SALDANO
Petitioner - Appellee
JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION
Respondent - Appellee
v.
TOM O’CONNELL, Collin County Criminal District Attorney
Movant - Appellant
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
February 18, 2003
Before KING, Chief Judge, and SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
KING, Chief Judge:
In 1996, Victor Hugo Saldano was convicted and sentenced to
death for the capital murder of Paul King. On appeal, we are
asked to resolve whether the district court erred in holding that
the Collin County District Attorney’s application for intervention
presented it with non-justiciable political questions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Page 2
2
The Collin County District Attorney’s Office (“District
Attorney”) represented the State of Texas in this case at trial and
on Saldano’s direct appeal of his death sentence to the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals. During the punishment phase of the trial, the
District Attorney called clinical psychologist Dr. Walter Quijano
to testify as an expert regarding Saldano’s potential for being a
continuing threat to society. Dr. Quijano identified twenty-four
unweighted “factors” that he deemed appropriate to the jury’s
sentencing determination. One of Dr. Quijano’s statistical factors
was race. As to this factor, Dr. Quijano correlated the over-
representation of African Americans and Hispanics in the prison
population (when compared to their percentages of the general
population) with an increased susceptibility for “future
dangerousness” within these races.
Because Saldano is from
Argentina, Dr. Quijano further testified that Saldano would be
considered Hispanic.
During closing arguments, the District
Attorney reminded the jury to rely on the twenty-four factors
outlined by Dr. Quijano in determining “future dangerousness” and
to take the formula of twenty-four factors and “plug it in.”
Saldano’s trial counsel failed to object to Dr. Quijano’s testimony
or the evidence and argument offered by the District Attorney
regarding race.
The jury ultimately found that Saldano presented a continuing
threat to society (by answering “yes” to the “future dangerousness”
Page 3
1
The District Attorney tendered to the Supreme Court a
brief in opposition to the Attorney General; however, the Supreme
Court returned it unfiled and denied the District Attorney leave
to file a brief amicus curiae.
3
special issue question) and Saldano was thereafter sentenced to
death by the trial court. On direct appeal to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, Saldano challenged the admissibility of Dr.
Quijano’s testimony. In response, the District Attorney argued
that Saldano was procedurally barred from raising this claim. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the District Attorney
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
On writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
however, the Attorney General of Texas (“Attorney General”) took
over the representation of the State.
The Attorney General
confessed error and declined to raise the procedural bar defense
previously argued by the District Attorney.
1
The Supreme Court
thereafter vacated the judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals and remanded to the court for further disposition in light
of the confession of error by the State. Saldano v. Texas, 530
U.S. 1212 (2000).
On remand to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the Attorney
General again confessed error in the trial court. The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, however, invited the District Attorney to file
a brief and to share in oral argument. The District Attorney again
argued that any error had been waived by Saldano. The court agreed
Page 4
4
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. In so doing, it
found that evidence regarding the correlation of race and
recidivism did not constitute fundamental error and that “the
State’s confession of error in the Supreme Court of the United
States is contrary to our state’s procedural law for presenting a
claim on appeal, as well as the Supreme Court’s enforcement of such
procedural law when it is presented with equal-protection claims.”
Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Saldano subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court contending that the District
Attorney’s use of race as a factor in the jury’s evaluation of
future dangerousness constitutes fundamental error requiring
reversal of his death sentence. In response, Respondent Janie
Cockrell, through the Attorney General, acknowledged that “the
infusion of race as a factor for the jury to weigh in making its
determination violated [Saldano’s] constitutional right to be
sentenced without regard to the color of his skin,” and “seriously
undermined the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial process.” The Attorney General did not raise, as a
defense, that Saldano had waived this alleged error. The District
Attorney moved to file a brief as amicus curiae; this motion was
granted by the district court. While acknowledging that the
Attorney General is the proper respondent for the State in this
civil case, the District Attorney also filed an application to
Page 5
5
intervene as of right. On July 16, 2002, the district court held
that the District Attorney’s application for intervention presented
it with non-justiciable political questions. The District Attorney
appeals this order.
JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although the district court here styled its order as a denial
of the District Attorney’s application for intervention, it, in
fact, did not opine on the merits of the application because it,
sua sponte, found jurisdiction lacking. See, e.g., Gordon v.
Texas, 153 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1998)(“We do not interpret the
district court’s opinion, however, to be a formal disposition of
the plaintiffs’ cases on these other bases. The court held that
the plaintiffs’ claims were nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine. Having concluded that it lacked the power to
adjudicate the plaintiffs’ claims, logically the district court
could not then proceed to address the merits of the other defenses
raised by the defendants.”).
Instead, the district court
specifically held that it had no jurisdiction to review the merits
of the application.
The Supreme Court has ruled that an
“abstention-based stay order [i]s appealable as a ‘final decision’
under [28 U.S.C.] § 1291 because it put[s] the litigants
effectively out of court, and because its effect [i]s precisely to
surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit.” Quackenbush v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713 (1996) (internal quotations and
Page 6
6
citations omitted). Likewise, as the district court order here
concluding that it had no jurisdiction to review the District
Attorney’s application for intervention “put the litigant[]
effectively out of court,” id., the order “conclusively
determine[d] an issue that is separate from the merits,” Id. at
714, and is thus a “final decision” under § 1291.
The district court’s order regarding its lack of jurisdiction
to review the District Attorney’s application for intervention is
a “final decision” for purposes of this court having jurisdiction
to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The relevant question
of law that this court must review de novo, therefore, is whether
the district court properly held that the District Attorney’s
application for intervention presents non-justiciable political
questions. See Guillory v. Cain, 303 F.3d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding that questions of law are reviewed de novo).
ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER and THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE
The district court sua sponte held that this case presents
political questions, stating that:
Although the movant frames the issue as controlled by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, whether to allow intervention under
that rule cannot be separated from a political question.
In other words, the question of whether a district
attorney, who originally represented the state in
criminal litigation, has a sufficient interest in the
death sentence obtained in that litigation to allow him
to intervene in collateral litigation about the
constitutionality of the sentencing procedures employed
Page 7
7
in that litigation is inextricably bound up with the
question of whether the State of Texas would prefer to
preclude the federal court from considering the merits of
Saldano’s constitutional claim, or would instead prefer
to allow the federal court to address the claim. The
court must abstain from deciding political questions.
See Public Citizen v. Bomer, 115 F. Supp. 2d 743, 746
(W.D. Tex. 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 274 F.3d 212
(5th Cir. 2001); see also Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289,
299 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986)
(Rubin, J., dissenting).
Upon review, we conclude that the questions presented by the
District Attorney’s application for intervention are justiciable.
Whether an issue presents a non-justiciable political question
cannot be determined by a precise formula. The doctrine is
primarily rooted in the constitutional separation of powers among
the three branches of the federal government. See Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
210 (1962). As observed by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,
each of the varying formulations which may be used to describe a
non-justiciable political question “has one or more elements which
identify [the question] as essentially a function of the separation
of powers.” Id. at 217. The Baker Court outlined the scope of the
political question doctrine by reviewing several of these varying
formulations:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
Page 8
8
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Id.
Threading the issues raised by the District Attorney’s
application for intervention through the prism of non-justiciable
formulations provided for in Baker v. Carr reveals that the issues
here are extricable from those barred from justiciability by the
doctrine.
The dominant consideration in any political question inquiry
is whether there is a “textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.”
Id.; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 252-53 (1993)
(“Whatever considerations feature most prominently in a particular
case, the political question doctrine is essentially a function of
the separation of powers, existing to restrain courts from
inappropriate interference in the business of the other branches of
the Government, and deriving in large part from prudential concerns
about the respect we owe the political departments.”) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, the
issues raised by the District Attorney’s application for
intervention are not issues that have been constitutionally
committed to coordinate branches or political departments. Cf.
Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
Page 9
9
(dismissing as non-justiciable an Establishment Clause challenge to
a statute authorizing $2.2 billion of emergency military assistance
to the State of Israel because authority for such action rested in
a coordinate branch of the federal government). Further, this
application for intervention does not present the district court
with a situation where it will lack judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving the intervention question
because the federal rules and case law governing intervention will
serve as the benchmark for a disposition of the District Attorney’s
application. See generally Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
228-29 (1993) (stating that these two concepts (the textual
commitment concept and the judicially discoverable and manageable
standards concept) are “not completely separate,” and that “the
lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the
conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a
coordinate branch”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 402-03 (1991)
(rejecting claim that vote dilution case was non-justiciable
because there are no judicially manageable standards for deciding
vote dilution); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 395
(1990) (“The Government also suggests that a second Baker factor
justifies our finding that this case is nonjusticiable: The Court
could not fashion ‘judicially manageable standards’ for determining
either whether a bill is ‘for raising Revenue’ or where a bill
‘originates.’ We do not agree . . . To be sure, the courts must
Page 10
10
develop standards for making the revenue and origination
determinations.”); cf. Trujillo-Hernandez v. Farrel, 503 F.2d 954,
955 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The question for decision is nonjusticiable.
The naturalization power is conferred on Congress in Article I,
Section 8, along with war power . . . It has never been supposed
that there are any judicially manageable standards for reviewing
the conduct of our nation’s foreign relations by the other two
branches of the federal government.”). Nor does the application
for intervention present the district court with a situation where
it will be required to make a “policy” determination of the kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion simply because the
determination may touch on political issues. See, e.g., League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 838 (5th Cir.
1993) (en banc) (reviewing the “political” dispute challenging the
single-district system of electing state trial judges in Texas in
a voting rights action involving the Attorney General of Texas and
the Texas Judicial Districts Board).
Additionally, as demonstrated by the case law, an important
overlay exists to the formulations discussed in Baker v. Carr. The
parameters of the political question doctrine generally extend to
cover the federal judiciary’s relationship to the federal
government, and not the federal judiciary’s relationship to the
States. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351 (1976) (“A question
presented to this Court for decision is properly deemed political
Page 11
11
when its resolution is committed by the Constitution to a branch of
the Federal Government other than this Court. Thus, ‘it is the
relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of
the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary’s
relationship to the States, which gives rise to the political
question.’ That matters related to a State’s, or even the Federal
Government’s elective process are implicated by this Court’s
resolution of a question is not sufficient to justify our
withholding decision of the question.”) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (emphasis added)). Here, it is undisputed
that there is simply no question that presents a conflict between
the federal judiciary and a coordinate branch of the federal
government.
In Gordon v. State, 153 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1998), this court
reversed the district court’s holding that issues relating to the
erosion of beachfront property presented nonjusticiable political
questions. Id. at 196. There, the plaintiff property owners filed
suit in federal district court against the Gulf Coast Rod, Reel and
Gun Club, the State of Texas, and various state agencies, alleging
that the defendants negligently constructed, dredged, and
maintained the Rollover Fish Pass (an easement located in Galveston
County that had been granted to the State of Texas by the Gulf
Coast Rod, Reel and Gun sportsmen’s club). Id.
They sought an
injunction ordering the State to fill in the Pass and to pay money
Page 12
2
The district court did not base its political question
holding on the Guaranty Clause and the District Attorney, on
appeal, does not contend that this case raises issues implicating
the Guaranty Clause.
12
damages. Id. The district court held that the issues were “far
more appropriate for resolution by Congress or agencies within the
Executive Branch” because the case presented policy decisions far
afield of the court’s practical capacities. Gordon v. Texas, 965
F. Supp. 913, 916 (S.D. Tex. 1997), rev’d, 153 F.3d 190 (5th Cir.
1998). Disagreeing, this court concluded that the district court
erroneously analyzed the political question issue.
In so concluding, we stated that “it is fair to say that,
Guaranty Clause cases aside, the potential for a clash between a
federal court and other branches of the federal government is
fundamental to the existence of a political question; a simple
conflict between a federal court and state agencies does not
implicate the doctrine.” Gordon, 153 F.3d at 194 (emphasis in
original).
2
Because “the plaintiffs [there] ha[d] requested no
action be taken by any unit of the federal government,” Id., we
held that “the district court erred when it dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claims as nonjusticiable political questions.” Id. at
196.
Our reasons for disagreeing with the district court’s
conclusion regarding the application of the political question
doctrine in Gordon similarly apply to the facts of this case.
Page 13
13
In sum, we see nothing about the District Attorney’s
application that removes it from the competence of the judiciary.
The reasons that supported the justiciability of challenges to
state legislative districts, Baker, 369 U.S. at 234-37, as well as
state districting decisions relating to the election of members of
Congress, Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), as well as the
constitutionality of apportionment schemes, United States Dept. Of
Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992), as well as landowner
suits against various Texas agencies, Gordon, 153 F.3d at 193,
likewise support justiciability of the “political” issues presented
by the resolution of the District Attorney’s application for
intervention. The district court’s “alternative” holding in Public
Citizen v. Bomer, 115 F. Supp. 2d 743 (W.D. Tex. 2000), aff’d on
other grounds, 274 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2001), and a statement that
is not necessary to the reasoning of the dissent in Baker v. Wade,
769 F.2d 289, 299 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Rubin, J., dissenting)
– both relied on by the district court to support its determination
that the District Attorney’s application presents it with non-
justiciable political questions – do not persuade us otherwise.
CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the district court’s order holding that the
political question doctrine prevents it from considering the merits
of the District Attorney’s application to intervene in this case
and REMAND the application to the district court for disposition on
the merits.

Google Yourself Corpus Christi: When Carlos Valdez Confesses Error Does Not The Same Rule Apply?

Google Yourself Corpus Christi: When Carlos Valdez Confesses Error Does Not The Same Rule Apply?


First, in seeking the death penalty, prosecutors sometimes overlook glaring illegalities.

"courts, especially state courts, are too often willing to overlook even obvious constitutional flaws when reviewing death penalty cases."


And if they are "willing to overlook even obvious constitutional flaws and glaring illegalities when Prosecuting & reviewing death penalty cases."

WATT about all of the other cases?

How many "overlooks" of
"constitutional flaws" or "glaring illegalities" have become tools of Cheating Prosecutors who have forgotten "Prosecutors, despite striking hard blows, must never lose sight of their ultimate obligation to do justice in every case.

How many Prosecutors deliberately commit the error of failing to file a reply brief in an Appeal Process because it deprives the appellant of exculpatory testimony, evidence, and confessions of error or witness tampering by the State Prosecuting Attorney?



----
CONFESSING ERROR
By EDWARD LAZARUS
----
Friday, Jun. 16, 2000

Earlier this month, Vincent Saldano, one of the 468 inmates on Texas' death row, had his death sentence vacated. This development was duly reported in the press. But accounts of Saldano's good fortune uniformly failed to appreciate what makes his reprieve truly newsworthy and potentially a landmark.

Saving Saldano: Texas Confesses Error



[Illustration]

Saldano was not freed from the prospect of execution by the actions of a court or even, as occasionally happens, by the clemency of a governor. His death sentence was erased because Texas, through its newly created office of the solicitor general, "confessed error" in his case -- that is, it admitted, despite defeating Saldano's initial appeals in court, that his death sentence was illegally obtained. Quite simply, this never happens, either in Texas or in the dozens of other states with active death penalty laws. It is thus worth pausing to consider the value and potential implications of Saldano's case as well as the notion of confessing error.

Saldano had received a death sentence in part due to profoundly troubling testimony by a state expert witness at the sentencing phase of his trial. The expert, a clinical psychologist named Walter Quijano, suggested that Saldano should be executed because, as an Hispanic, he posed a special risk of future dangerousness to society. To support this astonishing conclusion, the expert pointed out that Hispanics make up a disproportionately large amount of Texas' prison population.

It does not take a tenured professor of constitutional law to realize that linking racial identity with a propensity for violence was not only bizarre but also a violation of the equal protection clause. Indeed, that it should take a confession of error by the state to correct this problem highlights at least two problems in the current administration of the death penalty. First, in seeking the death penalty, prosecutors sometimes overlook glaring illegalities. The same flaw identified in Saldano's case infects at least seven other Texas capital cases. Second (and perhaps even more distressing), courts, especially state courts, are too often willing to overlook even obvious constitutional flaws when reviewing death penalty cases. After all, before the state's confession of error, Saldano had lost all of his appeals.

Under these circumstances, one might think that confessions of error would be, if not commonplace, at least occasional. On average, the Solicitor General of the United States confesses error in two or three criminal cases every year -- even though it is a safe bet that federal prosecutions, conducted by better trained lawyers with greater supervision, are less likely to contain obvious legal errors than their state counterparts. As the Supreme Court recognized when endorsing the practice in 1942, "the public trust reposed in the law enforcement officers of the Government requires that they be quick to confess error, when, in their opinion, a miscarriage of justice may result from their remaining silent." But as a practical matter, states never confess error in death penalty cases (even though courts overturn roughly two-thirds of all death sentences as legally infirm) -- and some states candidly admit that their policy is never to confess error.

Mutual Distrust

Why? One crucial and usually overlooked factor is the deep antagonism that has grown up over time between state death penalty prosecutors and the death penalty abolitionist lawyers who seek to foil them in every case. The abolitionists, prosecutors know all too well, never concede that their clients deserve the death penalty or that the death penalty was legally imposed -- no matter how flimsy their arguments in a given case. Rather, they use every procedural and substantive trick in the book to delay executions.

There can be no denying that such abolitionist tactics have angered and frustrated state prosecutors. And one response to these understandable emotions has been for prosecutors to mirror the fight-to-the-bitter-end approach of their opponents.

The problem with this reciprocation, however, is simply that the ethical duties of prosecutors and defense attorneys are vastly different. Defense attorneys are duty-bound to scratch and claw to win for their clients. Prosecutors, by contrast, despite striking hard blows, must never lose sight of their ultimate obligation to do justice in every case.


That may sound trite and perhaps overly idealistic, but it has a practical side as well. Prosecutorial confessions of error -- knowing when to fold them, as it is known -- establish credibility. They create trust in the system, a sense that someone is being careful and exercising sound judgment, that extends far beyond any single case. And that can make a world of difference for someone like me, who is not morally opposed to the death penalty but skeptical of how it is imposed.

Death Penalty Politics

In addition, the reluctance of state prosecutors to confess error is a clear reflection of how politics affects the death penalty. Up until now, anyway, undoing a death sentence was akin to political suicide for an elected district attorney or state attorney general, or for any state official with ambitions for re-election or higher office. And yet the willingness of Texas' new solicitor general to confess error in the Saldano case suggests a possible turning point. With the current groundswell of death penalty opposition based on the possibility of executing an innocent person, elected officials may now find some advantage in approaching capital cases (even those where innocence is not an issue) with a greater degree of care and honesty.

case will start a broad trend. But there is reason to believe that the tide is indeed turning. On June 9, Texas Attorney General John Cornyn announced the results of an investigation into other death penalty cases involving testimony by state expert Walter Quijano. Cornyn acknowledged that Dr. Quijano had provided testimony in six other death penalty cases similar to his improper testimony in the Saldano case. Cornyn's staff has advised defense lawyers for the six inmates now on death row that his office will not oppose efforts to overturn their sentences based on Quijano's testimony. In response, a pessimist might note that Texas is appealing a ruling in another capital case that the defendant received inadequate counsel -- when, indisputably, his lawyer slept through much of the trial. But doing the right thing has a contagious quality to it. Or at least so we can hope.


Edward Lazarus, a former federal prosecutor, is the legal correspondent for Talk Magazine and the author of Closed Chambers: The Rise, Fall, and Future of the Modern Supreme Court.